The State of Utah v. Boyd Donald Bagley : Brief of Appellant Boyd Donald Bagley by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
The State of Utah v. Boyd Donald Bagley : Brief of Appellant Boyd 
Donald Bagley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Kenneth L. Rothey; Attorney for Appellant 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Bagley, No. 19284 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4727 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NO, 19284 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs. 
BOYD DONALD BAGLEY, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON, PRESIDING 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BOYD DONALD BAGLEY 
KENNETH L. ROTHEY 
942 East 7145 South 
Suite 108 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(801) 566-1285 
Attorney for Appellant 
RICHARD D. MCKELVIE 
ROGER S. BLAYLOCK 
Deputy County Attorneys 
Metro Law Building 
431 South 300 East, Suite #2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363- 7900 
Attorney for Respondent 
FILED 
JUL;:, G 1983 __ ll __ :),f'.f __ _ 
'-... r::l..t, s._. Court, Uteh 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT SEEKS REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
RENDERED BY THE COURT BELOW. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
POINT I I 
THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT BY OFFICER SMITH WAS BASED 
ON A TAINTED AND SUGGESTIVE OBSERVATION 
DURING THE LONG PERIOD THE OFFICER 
OBSERVED THE DEFENDANT IN THE 
1 
2 
3 
6 
DETECTIVE'S OFFICE 10 
POINT Ill 
IMPROPER WEIGHING BY THE JUDGE OF 
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE 
STATE'S CASE VERSUS THE DEFENDANT'S 
DEFENSE 13 
CONCLUSION 14 
i 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
State v. Wilson, 
-- - 565 P.2d 66, 68 (1977) ................... 6, 7, 14 
State v. Mills, 
-- - 53lJP.2d 1272 (1975) .....••...••..•...•.. 6 
State v. Garcia, 
-- - 11 Ut. 2d 69, 355 P.2d 57 (1960) ......... 7 
State rr4per, 
Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764, (1949) ••.•••. 7 
U, s. v. Wade, 
- - - 1IDIU.S. 218, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 
1926..................................... 10 
State v. Strickland, 
-- - 556 P.2d 320, 322 (1976) •••.•••••••.••..• 11 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----oOo----
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
BOYD BAGLEY, 
Defenant-Appellant 
CASE NO. 19284 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Boyd Donald Bagley, was tried in the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah f9r the 
crimes of Burglary, Theft and Making a False Report. The 
information charging the defendant with those crimes stems 
from a burglary that occurred on September 19, 1982 at a 
Rainbo Gas Station at about 33rd South and 31st East in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. A sheriff's deputy, David P. Smith, 
arrived at the scene during the burglary and although by his 
own statements clearly observed one of the burglars at close 
range in good light for several minutes, he was unable to 
positively identify the defendant as being the burglar when 
given an extensive opportunity to do so only hours later. 
The officer did, however, promptly identify the defendant at 
trial several months later. 
DISPOSITION .!_ti THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Boyd Donald Bagley, was tried and 
convicted by the court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
presiding, a jury having been waived, of one count of bur-
glary, a third degree felony, one count of theft, a Class B 
misdemeanor, taking property of less than $100.00 in value 
and of making a false report as to a stolen motor vehicle, a 
Class B misdemeanor. Appellant was sentenced to: serve a 
term at the Utah State Prison from 0 to 5 years and fined 
$2,000 for the burglary conviction, that he serve 0 to 6 
months in the Salt Lake County Jail and be fined $299.00 for 
the theft conviction and also serve a term in the County 
Jail of 0 to 6 months and pay a fine of $299.00 for the 
false report conviction. He was further required to make 
restitution of an as yet undetermined amount. The appellant 
was granted a stay of execution and placed on probation 
under the custody of the court and under the supervision of 
the Department of Adult Parole and Probation until further 
order of the Court. 
upon: 
Such probation is to be conditioned 
.1. The usual and ordinary conditions required by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
2. Pay a fine in the amount of $750.00 at a rate 
to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
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3. Pay restitution in an amount and at a rate to 
he determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
4. Enter, participate in and complete the Prison 
Diversion Program. 
5. Enter, participate in and complete the program 
at the Weber County Alcohol Rehabilitation Program. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
APPELLANT SEEKS REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE 
COURT BELOW. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS - -----
On the night of September 19, 1982 at or about 
11:57 p.m., Officer Dave Smith of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office was patrolling the area of 3100 East and 
33rd South in Salt Lake City. As he passed a gas station 
owned by Rainbo Oil Co., he noticed that there was a white 
Ford Courier pick-up truck parked near the north side of the 
office building. After passing the station he noticed that 
a window had been broken out on the north side of the 
off ice. He also noticed a male Caucasian in the station 
office apparently removing items from the cooler located 
along the east wall. Officer Smith then drove into the 
station and parked his vehicle in front of the white pick-up 
truck. As he was getting out of his car to investigate, he 
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saw a man leave the office and begin to walk toward the 
drivers side of the pick-up truck. Officer Smith, who 
approximately 20 feet from the suspect, drew his service 
revolver and ordered the man to halt. Lighting conditions 
at the time are not known except that Officer Smith stated 
that he was close to the suspect and could see him clearly. 
The suspect did not stop but continued moving toward the 
vehicle, stating repeatedly "Don't shoot me, Don't shoot 
me". After the suspect had entered the truck, Officer Smith 
approached the passenger side of the small truck and while 
reaching inside and grabbing hold of the passenger continued 
to order the suspect to halt. Still the suspect failed to 
stop and in fact began to slowly back the truck into the 
northeast corner of the station lot with Officer Smith 
holding on to the passenger and demanding the driver to 
stop. The driver then changed gears and drove from the lot 
with Officer Smith still holding the passenger and talking 
with the suspect. The officer somehow became caught on the 
truck and was slightly injured as the truck drove away. 
Officer Smith managed to shoot at the right truck tires but 
the vehicle drove off. Officer Smith returned to his patrol 
car and radioed the description of the truck to dispatch. 
Minutes later,. Officer Smith learned of an accident 
involving a white pick-up truck matching the description of 
the truck he had just seen. He drove to the scene of the 
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dccident, some four blocks away, and met Officer Scott 
Robinson who had been assigned to investigate the accident. 
During that meeting, Officer Robinson showed a Utah Driver's 
License to Officer Smith and Officer Smith quickly 
identified the person whose picture was on the license as 
being the suspect that he had seen and talked to at the 
Rainbo station minutes earlier. On a second occasion that 
morning Officer Smith made a second positive identification 
of the suspect as being the person whose photograph was on 
the drivers license found in a wallet in the white pick-up 
truck. 
Bagley. 
That license belonged to the defendant, Boyd D. 
Later that afternoon, Officer Smith was on the 9th 
floor of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice and noticed 
Detective Bringhurst talking to the defendant. He stood and 
watched him for several minutes but could not ·identify him. 
Officer Smith continued to observe the defendant for an 
additional 30 - 40 minutes, part of that time watching him 
from another room and part of that time in the room with the 
defendant listening to him talk to Detective Bringhurst. 
Because Officer Smith could not positively identify the 
defendant at that time as being the suspect he saw and 
talked with some hours earlier, the defendant was not 
arrested and was allowed to leave. The defendant was, 
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however, later arrested and charged. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
Appellant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the judgment and that it would be a 
miscarriage of justide for this court to refuse review of 
his conviction. 
The authority for the reviewing court to reverse a 
judgment based on an insufficiency of the evidence is clear 
and longstanding. That standard for finding an insuffi-
ciency of evidence is that: 
It must appear that upon viewing the evidence, 
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed a crime. State Wilson, 
565 P.2d 66, 68 (1977). 
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was 
also discussed by this court in State 530 P.2d 
1272 (1975): 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 
conviction, it must appear that viewing the 
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn upon therefrom, in light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds 
could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 530 P.2d at 1272. 
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I n 11 U t. 2 d 6 9 , 3 5 5 P. 2 d 5 7 
(1960) this court stated: 
There is no jury question without substantial 
evidence indicating defendant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, This requires evidence 
from which a jury could reasonably find the 
defendant guilty of all material issues of 
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 355 P.2d 
at 59, 11 Ut. 2d at 71. 
In State ::!..!... Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764, 
(1949), the court said that: 
We do not ordinarily interfere with the rulings 
of the trial court in either granting or deny-
ing a new trial, and unless abuse of, or failure 
to exercise discretion on the part of the trial 
judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of 
the trial judge will be sustained. 201 P.2d at 
770. 
Clearly then, each case must turn upon its own facts as to 
whether a new trial is merited due insufficiency of 
evidence. 
The State has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged. Again 
from the Wilson court, 
As to defenses in criminal cases the defendant 
has no particular burden of proof except that 
the evidence be such as to create a reasonable 
doubt of any element of the crime. The burden 
is on the State to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and if the evidence with respect 
to any defense, e.g., in this instance, alibi, is 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted. 
Jn this case it is clear that that State has made 
out the crimes charged in Counts 1, 2 and 3, but it is also 
7 
clear that the State has not met its burden as to the 
identification of the defendant as the person responsible 
for the commission of those crimes. 
There may never have been a case wherein a positive 
identification should have been more expected than this. 
The witness was an experienced officer with some four years 
experience with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. His 
testimony (TR 6-25) was that he first observed a Caucasian 
male in the walled office of a Rainbo gas station, 
that the seemed to be well lighted, In fact, he 
could observe the suspect removing items from a cooler. He 
next testifies that after parking his car on the northside 
of the office, he saw a suspect leave the office and slowly 
walk to the driver's side of a small pick-up truck. During 
this time Officer Smith testifies he saw the man clearly, 
being about 20 feet from himself, and that he talked to the 
man, was backing away from him, ordering the man to 
halt. The suspect while retreating to the drivers' side of 
the truck talked to the officer, repeatedly stating "Don't 
shoot me, Don't shoot me". Officer Smith then approached 
the passenger side of the truck as it backed into the corner 
of the station, took hold of the passenger's arm and 
continued to order the driver to stop. The officer's testi-
mony is that he got a good look at the suspect's face all 
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during this time and that the suspect continued to look at 
the officer and plead that he not be shot. This situation 
continued as the driver shifted into drive and pulled out of 
the station, having driven a total of some 75 to 150 feet 
with the officer talking to and holding him at the point of 
a pistol. Minutes later Officer Smith identifies a drivers 
license picture found in the truck as being the same person 
that he had just had a confrontation with. Then some two 
hours later, he again identifies the same picture as being 
the suspect he had seen so well at the gas station. 
However, later that day he happens to see the 
defendant in Detective Bringhurst's office. He testifies 
that he watched the man for some time but could not 
positively identify the defendant as having been the man 
that he had held at the point of his pistol some few hours 
earlier. The officer testifies that he observed the 
defendant for some 30 to 40 minutes from outside the office, 
from within the office during during the questioning of the 
defendant and also for a time seated in another office 
watching the defendant through open doors. When asked by 
Detective Bringhurst if he could positively identify the 
defendant as being the suspect he observed at the gas 
station, he told this detective that he wasn't absolutely 
sure (TR. 42). 
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The defendant was released because Officer Smith 
could not make a positive identification only a few hours 
after he claims to have gotten such a good look at the 
suspect. In fact, he stated on the morning of the burglary 
that the suspect's face was burned into his memory. Officer 
Smith never gave a description of the passenger he claimed 
was in the truck at the time of the burglary in spite of his 
close proximity to the passenger. He claims to have held 
the passenger's arm for some time during the events of that 
late night/early morning encounter. 
This kind of faulty memory is not consistent with 
the training and experience of this officer and should raise 
substantial doubt as to his later positive identification in 
court. 
POINT I I ----
THE IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT BY OFFICER 
SMITH BASED ON TAINTED AND SUGGESTIVE OBSERVATION 
DURING THE LONG PERIOD THE OFFICER OBSERVED THE DEFENDANT IN 
THE DETECTIVE'S OFFICE. 
Where a prior tainted observation has ocurred, the 
court must determine whether or not a later in court 
identification is the result of observation during the 
commission of a crime of if it has resulted from the tainted 
incident. The United States Supreme Court in 
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388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926, set out the 
following test: 
Application of this test in its present context 
requires consideration of various factors; for example, 
"The prior opportunity to observe the alleged 
criminal act, 
The existance of any discrepancy between any pre-
line up description and the defendants actual description, 
any identification prior to line up of another person, 
The identification by picture of the person prior 
to line up, 
Failure to identify the defendant on a prior 
occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and 
the line up identification. 
It is also relevant to consider those facts-which, 
are disclosed concerning the conduct of the line up." 
While this case does not involve a line up per se, 
the same problem, with a tainted observation, is present. 
The Court was concerned with the situation where a witness 
is shown a suspect in such circumstances that the witness' 
testimony in trial as to the identification of the defendant 
is based on the tainted viewing and not on the witnesses 
recollection of witnessing the crime itself. 
The result of a suggestive or tainted pre-trial 
identification has been stated by several courts, among them 
the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Y.:_ 
Strickland, 556 P.2d 320, 322 (1976). 
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"Ultimately it is the in court identification 
that we must be concerned with. If the identi-
fication is tainted with a prior identification, 
whether made at a suggestive policP line up or 
at a suggestive preliminary hearing, the end 
result is the same: a high likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification and a concurrent 
denial of due process of law to the defendant. 
Considering the facts of this case and applying the 
Wade test, there can be little doubt that the in-court 
identification of the defendant by Officer Smith was the 
result of a suggestive prior encounter. 
1) Officer Smith by his own account had ample 
opportunity to observe the suspect at the gas station, 
indeed, he talked to him for some ti me and came to within 3 
to 5 feet of the suspect while the officer was pointing his 
pistol at the suspect across the width of a small pick-up 
truck. 
2) There is nothing in the record as to any 
description of the suspect by Officer Smith, but he does 
tell us that he didn't get any description of the passenger 
that he alleges he was holding on to. 
3) Officer Smith, after his encounter at the gas 
station, quickly identified the drivers license photograph 
taken from the truck as being a picture of the suspect he 
had seen at the station, 
4) However, Officer Smith failed to positively 
identify the defendant as being the person he had seen and 
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talked with only hours earlier. 
5) The period of time between the two events, that 
is between the burglary and Officer Smith's observation of 
the defendant in Detective Bringhurst's office was in the 
nature of hours. Yet he could not make the identification, 
In considering further the extent of the contact 
with the defendant, and the natural pressure that Officer 
Smith was under to make a positive identification of the 
defendant, it is entirely possible and even probable that 
during the time Officer Smith was observing the defendant, 
he substituted in his mind the identity of the defendant for 
the identity of the suspect that he had seen earlier that 
morning. 
Certainly this prolonged and studied observance of 
the defendant and the officer's inability to identify him 
at the time would lead the common man to question a positive 
identification made months later in court. Officer Smith's 
positive identification in court was the result of his 
suggestive observation of the defendant, 
recollection of the suspect at the gas station. 
POINT II I -----
not his 
IMPROPER WEIGHING BY THE JUDGE OF THE STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES OF THE STATE'S CASE VERSUS THE DEFENDANT'S 
DEFENSE. 
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In his closin['. comments, the judge, (TR. 104-106) 
seemed to be balancing the State's case against that of the 
defendant. He acknowledged the concern he had about Officer 
Smith's identification at the Sheriff's Office but then 
mistakenly stated that Officer Smith had made the identifi-
cation, the testimony of Detective Bringhurst (TR-42) was 
that Officer Smith had never made a positive identification 
at the office on September 20, 1982. Then, rather than 
considering the reasonable doubt raised by the inability of 
Officer Sll)ith to identify the defendant, the judge raised 
slight inconsistencies in the three alibi testimonies. The 
only inconslstencies, however, were at times not material to 
the burglary. All three alibi testimonies were consistent 
within reason during the period of time during which the 
burglary was alleged to have occurred. 
Again from the WILSON case previously cited: 
"The defendant has no burden of proof except 
that the evidence be such as to create a 
reasonable doubt of any element of the crime. 
The burden is on the State to prove his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt and if the evidence 
with respect to any defense, e.g. in this 
instance alibi, is sufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, 
he should be acquitted." 
Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (1977). 
CONCLUSION 
Reasonable doubt in this case has been raised in 
one area and supported by a second reasonable doubt in 
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dfl"Lh<>r area. The defendant claims an alibi as established 
hy three other persons. This doubt is strengthened by the 
1edsonable doubt raised as to identification by Officer 
Smith. His inability to positively identify the defendant 
only hours after the officer had an exceptional opportunity 
to observe the burglary suspect raises substantial doubt as 
to the guilt of the defendant. 
For these reasons the trial court erred in allowing 
an adverse judgment against the defendant based on 
insufficient evidence, which evidence was tainted by a prior 
"identification" and on a failure of the State to meet its 
burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The judgment should be revised and remanded to the 
trial court with directions to enter a judgment of acquital 
on all counts. 
DATED day of July, 1983. 
RESPECTIVELY 
I _)/ ,-, . 
SUBMITTED BY: 
Attorney for Appellant 
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